In Hungary Elections, Magyar Won While Orbán Was Saved

By Laszlo Bartus

Péter Magyar (L) and Victor Orbán during a European Parliament Plenary session. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán’s electoral loss seemingly disproves his assertion that his party, Fidesz could not be defeated. But the question remains; would Orbán have handed over power so easily to an opponent threatening real accountability?

Orbán’s loss was not a constraint, but a choice. He did not relinquish power because he could not hold on to it, but because in the long run he gains from it.

Orbán had every tool at his disposal to rig this election, just as he has done in past elections. At any moment, he could have hidden new changes in an omnibus bill that would have prevented his opponent, Péter Magyar’s victory.

But Orbán conspicuously did not do so, just as it was conspicuous that he allowed Magyar — a one-time Orbán ally who, despite heading the opposition center-right Tisza Party, has never renounced Fidesz’s ideology — to speak and campaign freely.

Orbán’s goal? To secure for Fidesz a legitimate position as Hungary’s largest opposition party just as Magyar assumes the task of cleaning up after 16 years of mismanagement, corruption and economic torpor. “The burden of governing does not weigh on our shoulders,” declared Orbán in his concession speech, the tone of relief in his words unmistakable.

What Magyar inherits is a looted, ruined country, financially and morally devastated, and burdened with immeasurable and partly unknown levels of debt.

There is, for example, the matter of Lőrinc Mészáros, a childhood friend of Orbán’s and among Hungary’s richest men. As a member of Fidesz, Magyar once held lucrative posts in businesses tied to Mészáros. And while questions abound as to how Mészáros accumulated his wealth, Magyar has made no mention of his case.

Instead, during his campaign, Magyar promised “accountability” on the one hand, and “reconciliation” on the other. Accountability will apply to those whom Fidesz itself has already investigated. Thus, it is expected that the disgraced György Matolcsy, former head of Hungary’s National Bank, and his inner circle will be held responsible for the theft of 600 billion forints (nearly $2 billion) from state coffers.

Reconciliation, however, will be reserved for Orbán and his close allies. Orbán, meanwhile, steps away without fear of prison, confiscation of his wealth, or the banning of his party for its role in what observers have called a “coup in slow motion.”

This is not the regime change Hungarians dreamed of. Rather than dismantling the system he takes over, Magyar appears to be preparing to operate it.

For Hungarians, that system has been a nightmare, one they directly associate with Orbán himself. His removal, therefore, was welcomed with glee. After the honeymoon ends, however, Hungarians may find that Orbán’s fall does not automatically translate into a restoration of democratic rule of law.

Magyar now holds the same two-thirds supermajority in parliament that kept Fidesz in power and allowed it to so thoroughly dismantle Hungary’s democratic institutions. His rise and eventual victory came through the support of voters — many to the left of Magyar — who he has deliberately kept out of Tisza. These constituencies also failed to win any guarantees from Magyar in exchange for their votes.

In effect, this means there are now no institutional mechanisms with which to hold Magyar to account, leaving Hungary exactly in the same political position it was in before Orbán’s ouster.  

As the international community celebrates, the reality is that instead of one Fidesz, there are now two. The closest parallel to U.S. politics would be a U.S. Congress consisting of two Republican parties: one MAGA and the other a reform MAGA, the latter bolstered by Democratic voters believing Trump can only be defeated by another Republican. The liberal left, meanwhile, is in tatters, nowhere to be seen.

While more polished and genteel than the outspoken, often blunt Orbán, Magyar nevertheless reflects the full ideological repertoire of Orbán’s illiberal regime. A few examples: Magyar never once stood up against restrictions on freedom of assembly; he has been an outspoken critic on immigration; he did not take part in the well-known Budapest Pride parade, going so far as to encourage his followers to stay away; and reports suggest he once sought to intimidate a reporter for questions he did not like.

There will be more surprises.

Meanwhile, Magyar’s more liberal supporters oppose any democratic alternative from emerging, arguing such a scenario would divide the forces opposing Orbán. The result? A far-right dominated parliament, one that includes the likes of Mi Hazánk, Hungary’s third largest party and one that openly espouses racial hatred and homophobic ideology.

There is also the danger that rather than moving closer to the center, Magyar’s voters could over time form the base of support for a reinvigorated Fidesz party.

We have seen where unchecked power leads. As Hungarians celebrate this current moment, they would be wise to remain vigilant, and to read the signs.

One indicator will be whether Magyar reinstates Pastor Gábor Iványi’s Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship. Iványi, a fierce Orban critic, saw the Hungarian state lay siege to his church, stripping it of its status in 2011 after years of financial strangulation. Other signs include whether Magyar’s government takes steps to repay its foreign obligations, and whether court rulings are upheld and enforced.

If Magyar truly seeks democracy, accountability, and reconciliation, let him start here. Reconciliation is not only for Fidesz supporters. The real wounds are not theirs.

A longer version of this story was first published by Amerikai Népszava, the oldest Hungarian-language newspaper in the US.